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INTRODUCTION
This aim of this paper is twofold. First, it provides a critical review
of the two gender equality measures that have been developed by
UNDP in its 1995 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1995). Until
now, most academic attention has been directed to the Gender-
related Development Index (GDI) and much less to the Gender
Empowerment Measure (GEM). In identifying strengths and weak-
nesses of both indices, and especially on the GEM, the paper brings
new insights to the fore. The second aim of the paper is to develop a
new alternative measure of gender equality. This new measure, the
Standardized Index of Gender Equality (SIGE) draws on the good
aspects of GDI and GEM while at the same time attempting to avoid
their methodological limitations.
The measurement of gender inequality in societies has become
an important topic in the academic literature. One reason is that
gender equality is an important issue in itself. National and regional
governments, as well as citizens and NGOs are concerned about
eliminating gender discrimination and improving the relative situ-
ation of women. They want benchmarks and indicators to compare
the achievements in furthering an equal position of women with that
in other countries, and to assess the progress made over time.
The second reason why measuring gender equality has become
important is that there is renewed attention for the relationship
between gender equality and economic growth. The question is
whether more gender equality promotes or hampers growth. Grown
et al. (2000) observe that win-win situations are possible, as well
as win-lose scenarios. Some recent studies find a positive rela-
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tionship between gender equality and economic growth: the higher
the gender equality, the higher the growth rate (Dollar and Gatti,
1999; Klasen, 1999). In these studies, gender equality is defined
as equality in education. Seguino (2000) finds that high growth
is accompanied by low gender equality. She uses relative female
to male wages to measure gender equality and focuses on East
Asian economies between 1975 and 1995. High female-male wage
differentials and high growth were also accompanied by high
exports.
It seems that results are not only contingent upon different
scenarios, but also depend on what variable is used to measure
gender inequality. In order to reach more definite conclusions on
the relationship between gender equality and economic growth, an
indicator is needed that combines several dimensions of equality.
UNDP’s pioneering work in developing GDI and GEM has been
important in raising attention for gender inequality in international
policy debates, as well as in raising attention among academics for
the issue of measuring gender inequality. The GDI is meant to be a
measure of relative well being. In analogy with the Human Develop-
ment Index (HDI) it uses the variables adjusted income,1 education
and health. The GEM is meant to be a measure of relative female
economic and political power. It includes the share of women in
parliament, the share of women in technical and professional, and
management and administrative positions, and (unadjusted) income.
Both measures have since been computed annually.
One of the weaknesses of both GDI and GEM is that they do
not measure gender equality as such, but instead some combination
of absolute levels of achievement and a punishment for inequality
(see, for example, Dijkstra and Hanmer, 2000; Bardhan and Klasen,
1999). This implies that they cannot be used for assessing the rela-
tionship between gender equality and economic performance. Other
criticisms are directed to the choice of variables and indicators, and
to the construction of the overall index.
So far, UNDP has hardly changed the basic principles and the
methodology for computing GDI and GEM. There is one excep-
tion. In response to one of the issues raised by Bardhan and Klasen
(1999), UNDP has changed the computation of the GDI as of the
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1999 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1999; UNDP, 2000).
However, I will argue below that there are conceptual problems with
the Bardhan and Klasen (1999) reasoning on which the change is
based.
Inspired by the GDI and GEM, several alternative composite
indices for gender equality have been suggested (Bardhan and
Klasen, 1999; Dijkstra and Hanmer, 2000; Forsythe et al., 1998;
White, 1997). Before developing my own alternative measure of
gender equality, I will briefly review these earlier alternatives. The
new measure, the Standardized Index of Gender Equality (SIGE),
intends to include the most important dimensions of gender equality.
Its main advantages include that it is a measure of gender equality
as such, that it integrates the dimensions used in GDI and GEM, and
that it avoids most of their methodological problems.
GDI and GEM
A first line of criticism against GDI and GEM is about the choice
of dimensions of gender equality and of the indicators (variables) to
measure these dimensions. A second problem is the way GDI and
GEM deal with the relative female and male achievements on these
variables. In fact, both indices do not measure gender inequality as
such, but some combination of absolute levels of attainment and
relative female attainments. In addition, inequality is accounted for
in different ways for the three variables that compose each of the
two indices. As to the GDI, these limitations have been recognised
before (Bardhan and Klasen, 1999; Dijkstra and Hanmer, 2000;
White, 1997). As White correctly states, UNDP (1995) is wrong in
drawing comparative conclusions on gender equality on the basis of
the countries’ GDI scores (White, 1997). Thirdly, there are problems
with the construction of composite indices. Bardhan and Klasen
(1999) have also brought these forward, in particular for the GDI.
Again, the GEM received much less attention in this respect. In
the following, I analyze first the choice of variables, then the way
these variables are transformed and indexed in order to take account
of gender inequality, and finally I discuss the way the composite
indices are constructed.
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The GDI uses the same indicators as the earlier introduced
Human Development Index (HDI, see, UNDP, 1990), namely
income, life expectancy and education (Table I). With respect to
the choice of variables for the GDI, most criticism has been raised
against the income variable (see, Bardhan and Klasen, 1999; Dijk-
stra and Hanmer, 2000). This indicator is based on an estimate of
the female share in earned income (sf ). This is computed from the
female share in the economically active population (eaf ) and the
relative female/male urban wage rate (wf /wm), as follows:
sf = (wf /wm)× eaf[(wf /wm)× eaf ] + eam(1)
Definitions of economically active population vary, however. In
particular, work in family enterprises and in subsistence activities
is sometimes included and sometimes it is not, and this makes a
large difference for the outcome. Secondly, the fact that the urban
wage differential is taken means that rural wages and most informal
sector wages are excluded. In addition, urban wage rates by sex were
only available for 55 countries. A weighted average of the relative
female/male wage ratio found in these 55 countries (which proved to
be 75%) has been used for the other 130 countries. This implies that
for most countries, the 75% wage differential is simply assumed.
A final point of critique against this indicator is that the actual
distribution of income within households is not taken into account,
which may reinforce income differences (Dwyer and Bruce, 1988).
However, it is still very difficult to include this distribution given the
lack of systematic data on this issue.
Much less criticism has been raised against the other two indi-
cators in the GDI, life expectancy and education. As in the HDI,
education is a combination of literacy rates (2/3) and combined
primary and secondary enrolment rates (1/3).2 However, a problem
with the data on life expectancy is that they do not include the
“missing women.” Comparing the sex ratios for different countries,
it turns out that in some countries, especially in China, Bangladesh,
India and Pakistan, the actual ratio between women and men is much
lower than the expected ratio (Bardhan and Klasen, 1999, p. 990).
In these countries, girl babies are often much less desired than boys,
leading to sex-specific abortions or the neglect of female babies
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(Miller, 1988; Sen and Sengupta, 1983). Although the latter should
be reflected in life expectancy ratios, there will often be deficient
reporting of infant mortality. Life expectancy rates will in general
not account for these sex-specific “health risks.”
The variables that compose the GEM include 1) the female share
in parliament, 2) the female share in professional and technical,
and administrative and management positions, and 3) (again) the
female share in income (Table I). Critics have pointed to the limited
relevance of the female share in parliamentary seats (Bardhan and
Klasen, 1999; Wieringa, 1997b). In former socialist countries this
share tended to be high, but parliaments did not have much power.
It has been recommended to look at female representation in local
governance bodies, and to other indicators of female power such
as the strength of women’s organisations and the way women’s
interests are promoted. However, data on female representation at
lower levels are not systematically available, and there are concep-
tual and measurement problems involved in using other indicators.
With respect to the second variable, the female share in professional
and technical, and administrative and managerial positions not many
objections have been raised thus far. While the female share in
parliament may fluctuate according to the particular year in which it
was measured, the female share in these occupations is less sensitive
for the year of measurement. The third indicator in the GEM is the
female share in earned income. This is computed the same way as
for the GDI (see (1)), so the same criticisms hold.
Accounting for Gender Inequality
For the GDI the three variables are the female share in earned
income, and the male and female achievements with respect to life
expectancy and education. For the GEM there are three shares:
in income, parliament and in high labour market positions. I now
analyze how these outcomes are elaborated and indexed for inclu-
sion in the composite index, and how inequality is accounted for in
that process.
In the GDI, the general principle is that it begins with the overall
achievement (the average scores for men and women) and then
subtracts for gender inequality (see also Anand and Sen, 1995). The
male and female achievements for education and life expectancy
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are first indexed on a scale from zero to 100. Since adult literacy
and combined primary and secondary gross enrolment are already
figures between 0 and 100 per cent, no special calculation is needed.
The index for “education” is a weighted average of the achievements
on literacy (weigt of 2/3) and of combined primary and secondary
enrolment (weight of 1/3).
For life expectancy, the index is based on given minimum and
maximum values. These are different for men and women, taking
into account that women, on average, live five years longer than
men. For women the maximum and minimum values are 87.5 and
27.5 years, respectively, while they are 82.5 and 22.5 for men. The
life expectancy index for females (lindf ) is computed from the
actual value for female life expectancy (lf ) as follows:
lindf = lf − 27.587.5 − 27.5 =
lf − 27.5
60
(2)
and the life expectancy index (lindm) for males is:
lindm = lm − 22.582.5 − 22.5 =
lm − 22.5
60
(3)
In order to account for gender inequality, it is assumed that coun-
tries have a certain degree of “inequality aversion”: at the same
average level of, for example, the education indicator, a country
with equal scores for men and women will have a higher number
than a country in which male and female achievements differ. This
inequality aversion factor ε (epsilon) is set at 2, which implies that
the harmonic mean is taken from the female and male achievements.
The harmonic mean is weighted with female and male shares in
population (pf and pm), to get an “equally distributed index.” The
equally distributed life expectancy index, for example, is computed
as follows:
1[
(lindf )−1 × pf + (lindm)−1 × pm
](4)
For income the computation is a bit different. Until 1999, the
female (male) share in total income was divided by the female
(male) share in population to get “proportional income shares.”
The harmonic mean of these proportional income shares was then
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computed. Strangely enough, in computing this harmonic mean
the income shares were again weighted with shares in population,
as in (4). This is redundant, since shares in earned income have
already been divided by population share to get the “proportional
income shares.” One possibility to do away with this redundancy is
to compute harmonic means as in (4) directly from the female and
male shares in income. These shares should then first be indexed on
a scale from 0 to 100 by multiplying them with 2, as is also done
with the other two indicators in the GEM (see below).
Until 1999, the last step for the income variable was to multiply
the harmonic mean by the “adjusted” average income per capita and
then to index the resulting figure on a scale from 0 to 100. As in
the HDI, “adjusted” income means that per capita income levels at
higher levels are discounted. The reason for this is that in both HDI
and GDI the focus is on well-being, and that above a certain income
level the marginal increase in well-being as a result of that extra
income becomes progressively smaller.
As of the 1999 report, this procedure has changed in response to
the critique from Bardhan and Klasen (1999, p. 993). They argued
that multiplying the harmonic mean of proportional income shares
by average income means that similar gender disparities in income
shares have larger consequences at higher income levels than at
lower income levels. Furthermore, they argue that the procedure
assumes that “. . . every dollar difference in earned incomes is worth
the same, regardless of the average income levels, and that the total
penalty for a given gender gap should be proportional to the average
adjusted income levels of the country . . .” (Bardhan and Klasen,
1999, p. 993). They suggest that average female and male incomes
be discounted before the penalty for the gap in earned income is
computed, since this would be consistent with the methodology
for the HDI. In their view, this would also avoid that the same
gender disparity is penalized heavier at higher income levels. As
of the 1999 report UNDP has taken these comments on board, and
now computes the harmonic mean of the adjusted male and female
average p.c. incomes.
There are two problems with the Bardhan and Klasen (1999)
argument. First, it can be shown that the penalty for inequality is
not higher at higher income levels. The multiplication with average
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adjusted income per capita affects the ultimate level of the income
component of the GDI, not the penalty. Countries at higher income
levels will have the same fall in their GDI as compared to their
HDI, in per cent, as countries at lower levels of average income.
In absolute terms the scores of high income countries will fall more,
but this is not the relevant measure. What does hold, however, is that
the income component of the GDI is heavily influenced by the level
of average income. But the average achievement also dominates the
other two components of the GDI.
The second problem is that there does not seem to be a theore-
tical justification for discounting male and female average incomes
before computing the penalty for the gap. What this method boils
down to is that the gap itself is discounted: not only is the discount
larger at higher levels of average (male and female) incomes, but
also at larger differences between male and female average incomes
(with a large gender gap, male incomes are far more discounted than
female incomes). This is not in keeping with the basic reasoning
for the HDI that focuses on well-being. According to empirical
evidence on the satisfaction that is derived from incomes, relative
income matters more than absolute income. This means there is no
reason to discount the gap between male and female incomes, given
that these men and women live in the same country. In fact, given
that people compare their incomes with those of their neighbours
and fellow countrymen, there would be more reason to give a higher
penalty for the same gap at higher levels of income.
Table II illustrates the effect of the change in the computa-
tion of the income component of the GDI. Based on the data
published in the technical note in the UNDP, 2000 Human Devel-
opment Report, I take Ecuador as a starting point. The adjusted
income p.c. for Ecuador (so the income component of the HDI)
is 0.56. The female income share is 0.194. This gives a score for
the income component of the GDI of 0.36 in the old method, or a
penalty for inequality (HDI-GDI)/HDI of 37%. In the new system,
where female and male average p.c. incomes are adjusted before
computing the harmonic mean, the income component becomes
0.50. The penalty for inequality for this middle income country is
reduced from 37% to 21%.
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For a hypothetical country with the same female and male income
shares, the same population shares but a much higher income per
capita, the income component of the HDI is 0.88 (Table II). The
income component for the GDI in the old system is 0.56 and in
the new 0.83. The penalty for inequality falls from 37% (which is
indeed the same as in Ecuador) to 6%. In sum, as a result of the new
method, the penalty for inequality is lower for countries at a higher
level of income than for other countries.3
It should also be noted that the new system of discounting
average male and female per capita incomes still implies double
weighting for share in population: share in population is accounted
for in computing female and male income per capita, and then
again in computing the harmonic mean of the two adjusted average
incomes. To do away with this redundancy, the population share
can be skipped from the formula for harmonic mean. However, in
order to have a result that is meaningful on a scale from 0 to 100,
population shares should be replaced by 0.5 in the formula for the
harmonic mean.
Table II also illustrates that the level of the GDI income
component is heavily influenced by the level of income: in spite
of the same gender income gap, the GDI income component of
the hypothetical high-income country is much higher than the GDI
income component of Ecuador. It is very difficult for poor countries
to outperform rich countries on the GDI, no matter how equal they
distribute their income. This also holds for the scores on health and
education, the other two components of the GDI. As long as there
is a gender gap, the GDI will be lower than the HDI. The procedure
of multiplying with adjusted income is simply the consequence of
the wish to have a measure that reflects absolute levels of human
development as well as gender inequality.
For the GEM, all three indicators or variables involve female
shares in a total (parliamentary seats, occupations, and income, see
Table I). Theoretically, this could have led to a simple and direct
measure of gender inequality for all three components: multiplying
the female share by 2 would give a score on a scale from 0 to
100. However, in order to be “consistent with the methodology
applied in the GDI” (UNDP, 1995, p. 132), UNDP opted for the
use of population-weighted harmonic means again, to get “Equally
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Distributed Equivalent Percentages” (EDEPs). These EDEPs are
then multiplied by 2 to get a score between 0 and 100.
However, taking the harmonic mean means that the GEM is not
a direct measure of gender equality either: the harmonic mean of
female and male shares is higher than the female share, and thus
softens inequality. While in the GDI this can be justified by the
nature of the GDI itself, namely that it is meant to be a combination
of abolute levels of achievements education, health and income, and
relative female achievements, this same argument cannot be made
for the components female share in parliament or female share in
higher occupations. These shares do not provide a benchmark figure
indicating the absolute development of “democracy” or the extent
of progress towards higher labour market positions. The only thing
that the harmonic mean does is to soften the inequality.
Another problem is the way income is treated in the GEM. The
population-weighted harmonic mean is not taken from the income
shares themselves and then multiplied by 2, as in the other variables
of the GEM, but instead UNDP applies a similar methodology as in
the GDI. It is odd that the three shares in the GEM are not dealt with
in the same way.
But there is more. As in the GDI, shares in earned income are
used to compute average female income p.c. and average male
income per capita. These average incomes are then indexed and
finally the population-weighted harmonic mean is taken. This again
implies double weighting for the share in population. A more serious
problem is that there is also a difference with the GDI: in indexing
average incomes on a scale from 0 to 100, unadjusted income per
capita is used. With an average male or female income p.c. of x,
an assumed minimum of 100 and a maximum of 40 000, the index
becomes:
(x − 100)/(40 000− 100)(5)
UNDP’s motivation for taking unadjusted, and not adjusted
income is that income in the GEM is valued as a source of power and
not for its contribution to basic development (UNDP, 1995, p. 82).
This may be so, but the result is that the absolute income level
weighs even more heavily in the score for the income component
of the GEM than in the GDI: rich countries have a much higher
REVISITING UNDP’S GDI AND GEM: TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE 313
score than poor countries. Since the GEM is based on three shares,
it may give the impression that it is based on relative female
power. In practice, however, absolute incomes have a very large
impact.
The GEM is an odd combination of, on the one hand, two vari-
ables where relative female power is counted – albeit softened by
their harmonic means –, and on the other, one variable in which
the absolute income level per capita weighs heavily. Thus far,
these problematic issues of the GEM have been neglected in the
discussion.
A final remark which holds for both GDI and GEM is that the
procedure of taking the harmonic mean of female and male scores
punishes for inequality no matter whether female scores are lower
or higher than male scores (see also Dijkstra and Hanmer, 2000). As
a result, a country where women do better with respect to longevity
and education has a lower score (all other things being equal) than
a country where women and men have equal scores for these two
variables. This happens to be the case of Norway, the country used
as example in the 1997 Human Development Report to explain the
methodology for the GDI. In other words, countries where women
do better than men on some indicators cannot compensate for other
inequalities but are additionally punished.
The Composite Index
The third type of weakness of GDI and GEM lies in the construc-
tion of the final indices. In both GDI and GEM a simple arithmetic
average is taken of the scores for the three indicators. UNDP argues
that there are no reasons for the weights of the variables to be
different. However, if the variances of the three indicators differ
widely, the indicator with the largest variance has the strongest
weight in the overall index (Harvey et al., 1990; Perrons, 1995;
Sugarman and Strauss, 1988). For the GDI, the income variable
has a much larger spread than the other two variables. Bardhan and
Klasen (1999) computed the implied penalties for inequality for the
three indicators of the GDI. They showed that the gap in income
accounts for 85% of the total gender gap, on average. In fact, the
indicator with most conceptual and methodological problems thus
has the largest weight in the final outcome.
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Bardhan and Klasen focused most of their attention to the GDI.
The question is whether the GEM is also dominated by one or two
variables. What matters is not the spread in the three initial shares,
but the relative variation in the final outcomes of the computation on
the three variables. For this reason I computed these outcomes and
the standard deviation for a random group of high income, middle
income and low income countries (Table III). The standard deviation
of share in parliament is highest (27%) but the difference with the
other two variables is not big (20% for share in high occupations,
21% for income).
What Table III also shows is that the income component of
the GEM is very heavily, and even more than the GDI, influ-
enced by absolute levels of income. Column (5) gives the index for
average income per capita, (y – 100)/(40 000 – 100). The difference
between (5) and (3) in fact represents the punishment for the unequal
female and male share in income. Column (6) shows that inequality
accounts only for a small share of the total score on the GEM income
component. For half of the countries the share is smaller than 10%,
and the average is 16%. Although the income component does not
dominate the other two, as in the GDI, it can be stated that the
income component of the GEM can hardly be considered a measure
of gender equality.
Alternatives
The main criticism to GDI and GEM is that they do not measure
gender inequality as such. They combine measures of absolute
well being or income with some assessment of inequality. There-
fore, neither GDI nor GEM can be used to analyse the relationship
between gender equality and economic performance. In addition,
there are problems with the way GDI and GEM are constructed,
with the choice of indicators and the way these indicators are dealt
with before they enter as components in the overall index. In devel-
oping an alternative index for gender equality, not so much can
be improved in the choice of indicators since data availability is
limited. However, it can be attempted to avoid the methodological
problems.
Several alternative indices have been developed so far, in parti-
cular for the GDI. White’s GEQ (Gender Equality index) is defined
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TABLE III
Computation of GEM for 30 countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index Index Am, Pt Income GEM Index {(5) – (3)}/3,
Parl. occupations component GDP in %
Canada 0.66 0.98 0.51 0.72 0.55 7
France 0.32 0.65 0.50 0.49 0.53 6
Norway 0.92 0.90 0.54 0.79 0.56 3
USA 0.39 0.99 0.64 0.67 0.67 5
Iceland 0.75 0.90 0.51 0.72 0.53 3
Finland 0.89 0.85 0.45 0.73 0.46 3
Netherlands 0.81 0.81 0.44 0.69 0.50 11
Japan 0.28 0.65 0.48 0.47 0.55 11
New Zealand 0.82 0.95 0.41 0.72 0.43 6
Sweden 0.96 0.94 0.47 0.79 0.48 1
Suriname 0.52 0.68 0.09 0.43 0.12 25
Bulgaria 0.38 0.90 0.11 0.46 0.11 4
Turkey 0.09 0.62 0.12 0.28 0.14 9
Ecuador 0.14 0.89 0.07 0.37 0.11 41
Romania 0.21 0.90 0.10 0.40 0.11 8
Estonia 0.38 0.91 0.10 0.46 0.10 3
Iran 0.18 0.50 0.08 0.26 0.13 41
Syria 0.34 0.52 0.08 0.31 0.13 38
Algeria 0.12 0.51 0.08 0.24 0.14 41
Tunisia 0.25 0.67 0.09 0.34 0.13 27
Cameroon 0.21 0.54 0.05 0.27 0.06 18
Lesotho 0.39 0.93 0.02 0.45 0.03 19
Equatorial Guinea 0.32 0.42 0.03 0.26 0.04 20
Pakistan 0.10 0.38 0.03 0.17 0.05 37
India 0.27 0.37 0.02 0.22 0.03 29
Togo 0.05 0.47 0.02 0.18 0.03 16
Zambia 0.34 0.54 0.02 0.30 0.02 6
Bangladesh 0.33 0.54 0.02 0.30 0.03 33
Mauritania 0.03 0.46 0.03 0.18 0.04 8
CAR 0.13 0.46 0.02 0.21 0.02 6
average:
St dev 0.27 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.22 16
Source: Computed on the basis of data in UNDP (1998). It is assumed that female
population share is 51% in all countries.
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as the ratio of GDI and HDI (White, 1997). Forsythe et al.
(1998) focus on gender inequality (GI) which they define as (HDI-
GDI)/HDI. These indices are similar and do measure equality,
respectively inequality (see also Anand and Sen, 1995; UNDP, 1995,
pp. 126, 129). However, they still suffer from the other limitations
of the GDI, in particular, the peculiar way the income variable is
defined and measured, and the fact that the variation in the overall
index is dominated by the variation in relative income share.
Dijkstra and Hanmer (2000) developed a relative gender equality
index (Relative Status of Women, RSW) by taking the same vari-
ables as the GDI but using relative achievements on the three
variables. Although this is a more direct measure than the GEQ
or the GI, the other criticisms still hold. Former socialist countries
do well on this index since female labour market participation is
high and the income variable dominates the overall index. GEQ, GI
and RSW only include variables related to human development, and
exclude the power dimension that is measured in the GEM.
Bardhan and Klasen (1999) have computed a revised GDI.
Their GDI attempts to solve the de facto unequal weighting of
the three components, in two ways: First, they limited the maxima
and minima against which actual achievements in life expectancy
and education are related to actual minima and maxima over all
observations, thus broadening the range of possible achievements.
Secondly, they used different “inequality aversion” factors epsilon
for the different components, with the lowest epsilon for the income
component and the highest for life expectancy (respectively 1.5, 3
and 6). Although this is an improvement of the GDI, this measure
still compounds absolute levels of human development with relative
female-male achievements.4 In addition, using different inequality
aversions for different variables appears to make the measure more
subjective than it should be.
Apodaca (1998) develops an index composed of seven indicators
that measure women’s relative economic and social rights. However,
some of the indicators she uses are problematic, and she does not
solve the problem of the implicit unequal weights. This is what we
will do now.
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TOWARDS A STANDARDISED INDEX OF
GENDER EQUALITY (SIGE)
Ideally, a new measure of gender equality should meet the following
requirements:
1. The index should comprise of a number of indicators that, taken
together, represent all relevant dimensions of gender equality;
2. It should be a relative measure, that is, it should measure gender
(in)equality and not some combination of absolute well-being
and inequality;
3. The construction of the overall index should be such that there
is no unintended weighing of some factors more heavily than
other factors.
A further, practical necessity is that data should be available for
many countries, should be internationally comparable and as reli-
able as possible. Data availability is an important constraint, and
even if data are available, they are not always reliable. The data-
base I use here is the Women’s Statistics Database (WISTAT) as
developed by the UN and available on CD-ROM. The sources for
these data include internationally available statistics such as the
International Demographic and Health Surveys and the Yearbooks
of International Labour Market Statistics of the ILO. For some data,
WISTAT used national surveys, if available. I used the data from
the 1994 series, which was the latest series available in WISTAT,
but in practice data were often from (around) 1990. This means the
information is not very recent. For example, data for former socialist
countries reflects the situation of these countries when they were
still subject to central planning. Our index can only be considered
an illustration of what is possible on the basis of available statistics.
It should not give rise to conclusions on the current state of gender
equality in the different countries.
Furthermore, the knowledge of what the relevant dimensions of
gender equality are, and how these dimensions can be measured, is
limited. This holds, in particular, for measuring gender equality in
international perspective.
Possible dimensions of gender equality that can be used in cross-
country comparisons were discussed in a Workshop held some
years ago in The Hague. This was a unique setting in which
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researchers from many different cultures and from different disci-
plines participated.5 The explicit aim of the Workshop was to define
important aspects of gender equality and inequality that may hold in
different cultures. The following eight dimensions were identified
(Wieringa, 1997a):
1. Gender identity, which includes cultural issues such as the
socialisation of girls and boys, the rigidity of the sexual division
of labour;
2. Autonomy of the body, which refers to the absence of gender-
based violence, control over sexuality, and control over repro-
duction;
3. Autonomy within the household. This encompasses the freedom
to marry and divorce, right to custody in case of divorce,
and decision-making power and access to assets within the
household;
4. Political power, which includes decision-making at above-
household levels such as municipalities, unions, government,
and parliament;
5. Social resources, which refers to the access to health and
education;
6. Material resources, which refers to access to land, houses, and
credit;
7. Employment and income; this dimension is about the distribu-
tion of paid and unpaid work, wage differentials, formal and
informal labour;
8. Time; this is a separate indicator, and includes the relative
access to leisure and sleep.
Behind these eight different dimensions, four factors can be iden-
tified: 1) culture, that is, ideas on what is masculine and feminine, 2)
power, 3) access to social assets, and 4) access to economic assets.
Culture is most closely related to gender identity, but is also of
influence on all other dimensions. Power also plays a role in all
eight dimensions, but it is most explicitly related to dimension 4.
Dimension 5 of the Workshop was about access to social assets and
dimensions 6 and 7 deal with access to economic resources. Time,
in so far as it is access to leisure and sleep, is a social resource, but
it is also an economic resource.
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to use internationally available
data for all dimensions as identified in the Workshop. It is parti-
cularly difficult to find data for gender identity, or more generally,
for the cultural factor. However, cultural factors can be expected to
influence many gendered statistics that are available. For example,
culture will be of influence on women’s access to education, as well
as on their relative position in the labour market and in parliaments.
For autonomy of the body no internationally available statistics
are available either. Another dimension, for which no data are
available yet on a sufficient scale, is time use. In OECD coun-
tries, time use data is generally registered. UNDP (1995) published
data for gendered time use for eight former socialist countries and
nine developing countries, but in total this gives data for only 31
countries.
It is important to include several different aspects or dimensions
of gender equality in the new index. All participants in the discus-
sion considered the above-mentioned eight dimensions important,
but it was clear that some of them were more important in some
countries than in others. In some countries, for example, there is no
difference in access to education for boys and girls, while women
and men still hold unequal positions in the labour market. Similarly,
in some countries women have access to the labour market but at
the cost of having much less time for leisure and sleep, or vice
versa: women have more leisure than men but do not earn their own
incomes. This means that the different dimensions of gender equality
may move together, but not necessarily so.
The Choice of Indicators
In the following, I examine a set of variables for which data are
readily available, analysing what dimension of gender equality they
represent and how well they represent it. These variables are given
an operational definition by assigning indicators to them. The choice
closely follows the indicators used by UNDP for constructing GDI
and GEM, albeit that the way they enter the index is different. The
following five variables are examined:
1. Relative female/male access to education
2. Relative female/male longevity (life expectancy)
3. Relative female/male labour market participation
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4. Female share in technical and professional, and administrative
and management positions
5. Female share in parliament.
1. Access to education
Relative access to education is perhaps the most important and most
universal indicator for gender equality. It is one of the compo-
nents of dimension 5, access to social resources. But there is also
a relationship with access to economic resources: the higher the
education levels, the more chances women have to improve employ-
ment status and income. Furthermore, higher relative education will
also increase women’s autonomy in the household and women’s
power at above household levels. Finally, a relation with culture can
be assumed: if women and girls have more access to education this
reflects cultural changes in society, and it will in turn allow more
cultural changes in favour of women to come about.
For this education variable I use the same indicators as UNDP
has done for the GDI (UNDP, 1995), with the same weights: 2/3
for literacy and 1/3 for combined primary and secondary school
enrolment. Although this indicator is relatively undisputed, some
criticism can be raised, in particular to the use of school enrolment
ratios. These ratios say relatively little on school attendance and
performance. In addition, school enrolment may be high if there
is a lot of repetition: if many relatively old children are enrolled,
enrolment rates are raised artificially since the denominator is based
on a certain age cohort. However, since enrolment rates only consti-
tute 1/3 of this indicator, this problem is not considered to be very
serious. A difference with the GDI is that I do not take a harmonic
mean of female and male achievements, but simply use the relative
female/male achievement.
2. Relative access to health
The relative health situation of women can be captured by relative
figures on female/male life expectancy. This indicator reflects even-
tual discrimination in access to health services (dimension 5), and
through this, it may reflect cultural ideas on women and men. But
it also measures to some extent women’s relative access to leisure
and sleep, since more sleep and more leisure will generally foster a
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longer and healthier life. Since no direct data on access to leisure
and sleep (dimension 8) are available for a sufficient number of
countries, this is an advantage.
UNDP (1995) also uses relative life expectancy figures in the
GDI, but corrects them for the fact that women live, on average, five
years longer than men. Since the data are transformed and stand-
ardised before they enter the overall index (as explained below), I do
not need to apply any correction: the higher the relative female/male
life expectancy is, the better the relative health situation of women
is.
3. Relative female/male labour market participation
This can be measured by the ratio of the female economic activity
rate and the male economic activity rate. Participation in the labour
market is generally considered a sign of female emancipation. It
usually provides women with an independent income, and many
jobs give women access to some power. Labour market participation
is also assumed to foster women’s relative autonomy in the house-
hold. However, these positive consequences depend on the kind of
integration in the labour market.
Unfortunately, the definitions on “economically active popula-
tion” vary by country and sometimes by region within countries.
In some countries/regions, unpaid family labour and work in the
subsistence economy are included, in others they are not. For
example, the relative female/male labour market participation is 18
in Mali and 56 in Togo – both West African countries between which
relative female labour market participation cannot be expected to
differ very much. The large difference must therefore be due to
different operational definitions. Bardhan and Klasen (1999) report
large differences even within one country, namely between Indian
states. Obviously, unpaid family labour does not give women an
independent income, nor does it lead to more autonomy in the
household. Another problem with this indicator is that a high relative
female labour market participation may imply a double burden for
women. If women’s household and caring tasks are not shared with
men, the positive effect of labour market participation is offset by
a negative effect on women’s access to leisure and sleep, and so
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on women’s well-being and health. Since I intend to include an
indicator for health, this is not so problematic.
The income dimension is only captured to a limited extent by this
indicator. It is of course possible to multiply this ratio by relative
female/male wages, as UNDP does for the GDI, but for most coun-
tries these data are not available. Taking an average of 75% for all
these countries, as UNDP does, is not useful in the context of this
alternative measure since values will be standardised later on, and
multiplying all values by a constant does not change standardised
outcomes.
4. Female share in technical and professional, and in
administrative and management positions
This indicator is used by UNDP as part of the GEM. It is a
measure of access to economic assets, since these jobs are rela-
tively better paid than many other jobs. Access to administrative
and management positions reflects to some extent decision making
power in society, while access to technical and professional occupa-
tions reflects opportunities for career development (UNDP, 1995).
At the same time, this indicator is also an approximation for relative
female participation in the formal labour market (as opposed to
labour market participation in general which may be in unpaid
family labour), albeit that not all sectors are represented.
This indicator is much less sensitive to statistical conventions
than the one on relative labour market participation. It also says
something on relative female power. The higher the share of women
in these positions, the more power women have in society relative
to men. Women in these formal labour market positions will,
on average, also have more power and autonomy in the house-
hold. In addition, this indicator reflects aspects of culture. And in
comparison to the female share in parliament (see below), it is much
less sensitive to the particular year in which it is registered.
5. Female share in parliament
This is an obvious indicator for relative female power in society.
However, the limitations of this indicator are well-known and have
been pointed out above: it only includes female power at national
level, in some countries parliaments have little power, it is only
about formal power, and the figure is sensitive to the particular year
REVISITING UNDP’S GDI AND GEM: TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE 323
in which it is measured. Nevertheless, it seems to be an important
indicator for relative female power. One can assume that there is also
a relationship between this indicator and cultural factors, as well
as with autonomy in the household. Women cannot be members of
parliament if they are not allowed to “go out” by their husbands
or fathers. The main advantage of this indicator is that data are
available for many countries.
The Composite Index
If the different variables of an index move together, it is possible to
apply an empirical analysis for the decision on which of these indi-
cators to include in the overall index. For example, in constructing
an index of labour market inequality, the different indicators are
expected to have a high correlation with each other (see, Sugarman
and Straus, 1988). In that case, the internal consistency of the scale
can be examined by computing the “Cronbach alpha.” Those indi-
cators with a too low correlation with the other indicators and
with the overall index are removed. However, as noted above, the
different dimensions of gender equality may move together but may
also move in opposite directions. This implies that I cannot rely on
an empirical analysis. The presence or absence of a relationship with
other indicators does not say anything on the validity of inclusion of
the indicator in the overall index.
From the qualitative discussion above, it seems a good choice to
include all five indicators: there are two variables for access to social
assets, two variables for the labour market, and one for relative
power in society. Although all have their weaknesses, the combi-
nation of the five and giving them equal weight can be expected to
minimise distortions.
In order to combine these indicators in one index, some elabo-
ration of the raw data is necessary. All five are relative indicators:
female achievements divided by male achievements, or female
shares (Table IV). In order to avoid the unintended overweighting
of one indicator above others, it is necessary to standardise the raw
data. For the construction of the overall index, I standardised the
initial scores expressing them as number of standard deviations from
the mean of the series, as follows:
zij = (xij − µj)/σj(6)
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TABLE IV
The computation of the Standardized Index of Gender Equality (SIGE)
Variable Indicator Transformation/
standardisation
Index
Education Relative female/male literacy rates
(2/3);
relative female/male combined
enrolment rate (1/3);
weighted average
yes (power 5),
yes
Simple
arithmetic
average of
standardised
scores
Health Relative female/male life expectancy no, yes
Labour market
participation
Relative female/male economic
activity rate
no, yes
Share in higher
labour market
occupations
positions
Female share in technical and
professional, and administrative and
management positions
no, yes
Share in
parliament
Female share in parliamentary seats yes (power 0.5),
yes
Source: text.
Where:
zij = standardised score of country i on indicator j, j = 1–5
xij = score of country i on indicator j, j = 1–5
µj = arithmetic mean of scores of all countries on indicator j
σj = standard deviation of scores of all countries on indicator j
However, mean and standard deviation cannot be meaningfully
used if the distribution is not approximately normal. For this reason,
some series had to be transformed.6 The standardisation has been
applied to the transformed scores. Finally, a Standardised Index of
Gender Equality (SIGE) was computed by taking a simple arith-
metic mean of the standardised and sometimes first transformed,
scores on the indicators. The index Zi for each country i is therefore:
Zi =


5∑
j=1
zij

 /5(7)
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RESULTS AND FURTHER ANALYSIS
The Appendix Table shows the results of combining these five indi-
cators in one index, the Standardised Index for Gender Equality
(SIGE). The index could be computed for 115 countries. Figures run
from small negative to small positive numbers, with an average close
to zero. Finland comes on top, followed by Sweden and Denmark.
The Table also shows the original scores for each of the five indi-
cators, and the rank of each country on each separate indicator (in
italic).
Finland has high ranks for all five indicators, and scores best on
female representation in parliament. Sweden owes its high score
to the high female share in professional, technical, administrative
and management positions (STPAM), but also scores well on parlia-
mentary representation (SPAR). Apart from several other industri-
alised countries (Norway, Canada, Austria), some former socialist
countries also do well on this Index (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria).
The Appendix Table shows that this is not so much due to their score
on female share in parliament, as would be expected, but more to
the high scores on the two labour market variables: relative female
labour market participation (REAP) and STPAM. Poland also has a
high score on relative life expectancy for women (RLEXP).
Some Caribbean countries can also be found relatively high:
Jamaica (7), Barbados (11), Guyana (12), Suriname (20), Cuba
(21), and Trinidad and Tobago (22). These countries score well on
labour market participation, with the exception of Guyana, which
owes its relatively high score to high female parliamentary repre-
sentation. Nicaragua is the highest Latin American country (at 15),
probably due to the socialist policies in the 1980s that improved
women’s relative access to social resources. El Salvador is in the
25th position. In the ranks between 34 and 82 we find all other
Latin American and Caribbean countries. The Philippines is the
Asian country with the highest rank (24), followed by Thailand
(30) and China (43). Most Asian countries are in much lower ranks,
however. Predominantly Muslim countries Bangladesh, Afghanistan
and Pakistan close the list. The highest African country is the rela-
tively rich Botswana (at 33), and Swaziland (37) and Lesotho (38)
follow this country. Rwanda is also just within the first 50, due to
its high rank (1st) on relative female labour market participation
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(REAP). Most Sub-Saharan African countries can be found between
ranks 50 and 100, however, while most North African countries can
be found between 103 and 112.
Surprisingly, the empirical results for the much criticised indi-
cator female share in parliament do not seem to deviate much from
what one would expect a priori. In all countries the share of women
in parliament is low, but it is relatively higher in western countries
where one would expect values that accept women in higher posi-
tions to have changed most. Finland scores highest, while Norway,
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands are in places 3–6. One
exception to this rule is Guyana that ranks 2d on this variable. The
“(former) socialist country effect” does seem to hold, however, for
Cuba and China, respectively 7th and 9th on this indicator.
El Salvador has the highest score for relative life expectancy
(RLEXP), while Nicaragua ranks 4th on this indicator. These high
scores are probably due to the civil wars that these countries had
just gone through and that took more losses among the male popu-
lation. Some former socialist countries (Poland, Hungary) also do
well on this indicator. Again, this seems more the result of higher
male mortality, perhaps due to high alcohol abuse among men. In
the US, the relatively high score may be due to the fact that men are
more often victims of criminality.
With respect to relative female labour market participation
(REAP), Rwanda comes in first place, followed by Mozambique
and Benin. It is clear that statistical conventions in these coun-
tries allow for including women working as unpaid family members
in subsistence agriculture in the registered labour force. In other
countries, such as Guatemala or the earlier mentioned Mali, this is
probably not the case. Although this obviously distorts the results,
the inclusion of the other labour market variable STPAM corrects
the distortion to some extent.
Relationships between Dimensions
When trying to combine a smaller number of indicators in one
Index, the distortions caused by disadvantages of particular indi-
cators come to the fore more sharply. For example, a subset of three
indicators that includes life expectancy brings El Salvador to a much
higher position. Subsets that include two labour market variables
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TABLE V
Linear bivariate correlation coefficients between SIGE5 and components,
in per cent
REDUC RLEXP REAP STPAM SPAR SIGE5
REDUC 52** 2 73** 43** 78**
RLEXP 52** 34** 40** 34** 71**
REAP 2** 34** 22** 46** 51**
STPAM 73** 40** 22** 38** 81**
Table
SPAR 43** 34** 46** 38** 69**
SIGE5 78** 71** 51** 81** 69**
Source: Own computations.
∗∗ Correlation is significant at 0.01 level.
in addition to education give higher results for the former socialist
countries. An Index combining REDUC, STPAM and SPAR gives a
similar rank as SIGE5.
In order to examine the relationships between these indicators, I
used the transformed data (where applicable) for the five variables.
Table V presents the correlation coefficients between these (trans-
formed) five indicators. Relative access to education (REDUC)
proves to have rather high and statistically significant correlations
with relative life expectancy (RLEXP), female share in parliament
(SPAR) and, above all, with female share in technical and profes-
sional, and administrative and management positions (STPAM).
Surprisingly, the correlation between REDUC and REAP proves to
be almost zero and is statistically insignificant.
The relative female/male activity rate (REAP) proves to have
a rather low (22%) but significant correlation with STPAM. The
relationship between relative life expectancy and the two labour
market indicators is positive and significant, but not very high. It
is higher for STPAM than for REAP. This does not rule out the
possibility of a trade-off between a higher work burden as reflected
in participation in the labour market and women’s relative health,
but it seems that relative labour market participation and relative
health also move together. They appear to be related more strongly
if we deal with participation in white-collar jobs than for jobs in
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general. The female share in parliament has a positive and signi-
ficant correlation (ranging between 32 and 46%) with all other
indicators.
As could be expected, the correlation between the overall index
SIGE5 and its components is high and significant. It is highest
for STPAM and REDUC, and lowest for REAP. The presence or
absence of linear relationships between the components is also
confirmed in Figure 1, which shows bivariate scatter plots. By
looking at the plots, non-linear relationships can be discerned. The
plot for REAP with REDUC confirms the heterogeneous nature of
data on relative economic activity rate: in many countries, a high
score means that women are highly represented in the agricultural
subsistence sector or as unpaid family workers, with low education;
in other countries, it points to a high participation in the formal
labour market and it is accompanied by high relative education. The
relationship has the form of a “U.” There is high relative labour
market participation at low relative education levels, and at high
relative educational levels, while it is low at middle educational
levels.
Goldin (1994) found a U-shaped relationship between economic
development, measured as GDP per capita, and a related indicator,
namely absolute female labour market participation. She explains
it as follows. At low levels of development female labour market
participation is high but is concentrated in agricultural activities.
When education begins to become available, boys benefit first.
General income levels rise but female labour market participation
decreases, both because of the (family) income effect and because
of a “stigma” (taboo) on married women’s outside work. At higher
levels of income, girls also get access to education. In addition, the
service sector expands. The stigma is weaker for the service sector
than for manufacturing. These two factors explain the right side of
the “U.” Possibly, these factors can also explain the U-formed rela-
tionship between relative labour market participation and variables
such as relative female access to education.
Comparison with GDI and GEM
Finally, we compare the results on SIGE5 with those for UNDP’s
indices GDI and GEM. SIGE more or less integrates the dimen-
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Figure 1. Scatter plot of bivariate relationships between the five components
of SIGE: Relative Education (REDUC), Relative Life Expectancy (RLEXP),
Relative Female Labour Market Participation (REAP), Share in Technical,
Professional, Administrative and Management Positions (STPAM) and Share in
Parliament (SPAR).
sions of GDI (education, life expectancy, and income) and GEM
(female share in high labour market positions, in parliament, and
income again). However, as explained above, GDI and GEM
combine assessments of gender inequality with absolute scores on
the different dimensions. In addition, most of the variation in the
GDI is explained by the variation in the income variable, which in
itself is partly dependent on the absolute income level. In the GEM,
the income variable is less dominant in the overall score, but the
score on the income variable is influenced strongly by the level
of average income per capita. As a result of these characteristics,
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the scores on both GDI and GEM can be expected to be biased
towards countries at higher average income levels. When comparing
the scores on SIGE, GDI and GEM we would expect to find some
evidence for this bias: at least some countries with low average
income can be expected to receive higher scores on SIGE than on
GDI and/or GEM, and vice versa.
It is difficult to compare scores on the different measures, since
the range of possible scores of SIGE is not equal to the range of
possible scores on GDI and GEM. But it is possible to compare
countries’ rankings. Table VI presents the ranks for a group of 25
countries at the top of the SIGE list (only including countries for
which scores on SIGE, GDI and GEM are available), and for a group
of 13 countries at the bottom of the SIGE ranking – the latter listed
in reverse order.7
For the four Nordic countries and also for the numbers 9–11 on
the SIGE list (Canada, Austria and Barbados), there is hardly any
difference between the rankings on the three indices. However, for
most other countries the rankings differ. Countries such as Poland,
Hungary, but also Nicaragua, Suriname and El Salvador seem to
reflect the “income effect” as they have much higher SIGE rankings
than GDI or GEM rankings. On the other hand, richer countries such
as the USA and New Zealand fall on the SIGE list as compared to
the GDI and GEM lists, meaning that they owe their high ranks on
GDI and GEM at least in part to their high absolute income levels.
For the Netherlands and Luxembourg, a similar income effect holds
for the GEM, but not for the GDI: their GDI ranking is lower than
the SIGE ranking. This is an interesting outcome, and probably
reflects the dominance of the income variable in the GDI. In both
countries the female share in earned income is relatively low (25
and 23 percent, respectively, see, UNDP, 1995, p. 76). France, on
the other hand, has a relatively high GDI, reflecting a much higher
female share in earned income (36%), while its GEM ranking is
lower than the SIGE ranking. This country has a relatively low
female share in parliament (see Appendix table), which is only one
out of five variables in the SIGE but one out of three in the GEM.
The GDI ranks of Cuba and of Trinidad and Tobago also seem to
be lower due to the lower average income levels in these countries
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TABLE VI
Rank comparison SIGE, GDI and GEM
SIGE rank GDI rank GEM rank SIGE-GDI SIGE-GEM
Top:
Finland 1 2 3 –1 –2
Sweden 2 1 1 1 1
Denmark 3 4 4 –1 –1
Poland 4 22 32 –18 –28
Norway 5 3 2 2 3
Hungary 6 23 18 –17 –12
Canada 9 9 5 0 4
Austria 10 10 9 0 1
Barbados 11 11 12 0 –1
USA 13 5 8 8 5
Nicaragua 15 73 34 –58 –19
Netherlands 16 20 7 –4 9
France 17 7 31 10 –14
New Zealand 19 12 6 7 13
Suriname 20 54 64 –34 –44
Cuba 21 47 16 –26 5
Trinidad and Tobago 22 36 15 –14 7
Luxembourg 23 35 13 –12 10
Philippines 24 64 28 –40 –4
El Salvador 25 76 44 –51 –19
Bottom, in reverse order:
Pakistan 1 28 3 –27 –2
Afghanistan 2 1 1 1 1
Tunisia 4 72 26 –68 –22
India 5 32 16 –27 –11
Mauritania 6 15 6 –9 0
Egypt 7 39 21 –32 –14
Iran 8 65 22 –57 –14
Morocco 9 38 32 –29 –23
Nepal 10 16 44 –6 –34
Comorros 11 33 4 –22 7
Mali 12 3 20 9 –8
Papua New Guinea 13 45 17 –32 –4
Source for SIGE: Appendix Table, for GDI and GEM: UNDP, 1995.
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while these countries have relatively high gender equality in the
education and health dimensions.
At the bottom of the SIGE list, the income effect is most clearly
visible for countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Iran and Morocco, and
to some extent also for India and Papua New Guinea. These coun-
tries with high gender inequality do not have such low GDI and
GEM rankings because their average income levels are not at the
bottom. The income effect also explains why Pakistan (real GDP
per capita of PPP$2890, see, UNDP, 1995, p. 157) has a much higher
score on the GDI than Afghanistan ($819) and Comorros ($1350). In
sum, the comparisons show that there is indeed evidence for a bias
in the GDI and GEM scores towards higher average income levels.
The SIGE on the other hand is really measuring gender inequality
regardless of absolute levels of income or absolute scores on other
dimensions.
CONCLUSION
It is important to develop a measure of gender equality that can
be used to compare different countries and to assess progress in
countries over time. Furthermore, such a measure can be used to
examine the relationship between gender equality and economic
performance. This paper has analyzed the two measures developed
by UNDP, the GDI and the GEM (UNDP, 1995). It shows that they
are not suitable for examining this relationship, because absolute
levels of development weigh heavily in these measures. GDI and
GEM also suffer from some other methodological problems.
The second part of the paper develops an alternative measure
of gender equality, the “Standardised Index of Gender Equality”
(SIGE). This measure attempts to encompass all possible dimen-
sions of gender equality and it avoids the conceptual and method-
ological problems of GDI and GEM. It is really an assessment of
relative female power and relative female access to assets. Obvi-
ously, SIGE is not the ultimate measure of gender equality. More
international comparable data are necessary, in particular, on time
use. However, SIGE can serve as a first approximation of such an
overall index.
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Appendix Table
Countries ranked according to SIGE, with scores and ranks (in italics) on five
components
Country REDUC RLEXP REAP SPTAM SPAR SIGE5
1 Finland 102.9 3 111.4 5 83.4 8 55.7 8 39.0 1 1.70
2 Sweden 100.7 18 108.0 40 78.2 15 63.6 1 33.5 4 1.44
3 Denmark 100.7 19 108.4 36 77.9 16 56.0 7 33.0 5 1.33
4 Poland 99.7 31 112.7 2 80.1 13 59.1 4 9.3 42 1.25
5 Norway 100.3 21 109.3 20 68.3 21 49.8 14 35.8 3 1.22
6 Hungary 100.1 23 112.4 3 76.3 17 52.4 11 7.3 56 1.05
7 Jamaica 102.3 4 106.3 74 83.3 9 59.6 3 12.4 26 1.01
8 Bulgaria 92.9 54 109.3 22 85.3 5 54.1 9 12.9 22 0.94
9 Canada 100.0 25 109.3 21 64.8 29 49.4 15 13.2 21 0.83
10 Austria 100.8 15 109.4 18 61.6 35 39.3 49 21.1 8 0.81
11 Barbados 99.3 34 107.0 60 82.0 10 45.5 25 14.3 19 0.78
12 Guyana 96.7 46 109.4 19 33.6 88 45.1 26 36.9 2 0.77
13 United States 100.1 24 109.7 14 67.2 24 46.2 22 10.3 37 0.76
14 Germany 98.4 39 109.0 27 60.2 39 42.1 38 20.0 10 0.74
15 Nicaragua 103.9 2 111.9 4 33.8 86 38.2 53 16.3 14 0.70
16 Netherlands 100.0 26 108.8 30 44.1 66 38.1 54 28.0 6 0.67
17 France 101.3 10 111.4 6 64.4 30 40.9 43 5.7 68 0.67
18 Romania 102.3 5 109.0 26 84.9 6 43.4 32 2.9 93 0.67
19 New Zealand 100.4 20 108.6 32 53.0 51 42.6 36 16.5 13 0.64
20 Suriname 101.2 11 107.5 51 41.2 71 62.5 2 5.9 66 0.57
21 Cuba 101.0 12 104.8 97 48.0 61 47.1 19 22.8 7 0.55
22 Trinidad and 98.2 40 107.4 53 42.7 68 49.0 16 17.7 11 0.54
Tobago
23 Luxembourg 100.8 13 110.6 9 45.1 63 35.6 64 13.3 20 0.54
24 Philippines 99.8 30 106.1 82 45.8 62 57.6 6 11.2 34 0.54
25 El Salvador 93.8 53 115.1 1 33.9 85 40.7 45 8.3 48 0.54
26 Yugoslavia 91.5 57 108.1 38 62.2 33 44.7 28 15.6 17 0.53
(former)
27 Belgium 100.0 27 109.2 23 48.9 59 43.4 33 10.1 38 0.52
28 Switzerland 99.0 37 109.2 24 54.9 45 33.5 70 15.9 15 0.50
29 Australia 100.7 16 108.7 31 61.4 36 33.3 71 12.6 24 0.50
30 Thailand 97.0 44 108.0 41 81.1 11 43.9 30 3.7 88 0.48
31 Uruguay 100.8 14 109.4 17 43.7 67 50.8 13 4.6 80 0.47
32 Portugal 91.2 58 110.1 12 52.6 52 47.5 18 8.7 45 0.46
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Appendix Table
Continued
Country REDUC RLEXP REAP SPTAM SPAR SIGE5
33 Botswana 84.1 70 110.8 8 50.7 56 58.5 5 5.0 77 0.46
34 Venezuela 98.9 38 109.2 25 38.9 74 46.6 21 9.2 43 0.43
35 Ireland 101.4 8 107.9 42 42.0 70 41.4 41 12.4 25 0.42
36 Argentina 101.7 7 110.0 13 38.3 76 46.7 20 4.6 81 0.41
37 Swaziland 95.3 50 106.7 68 62.0 34 51.7 12 5.7 67 0.39
38 Lesotho 90.6 60 109.0 28 71.7 18 53.4 10 1.5 102 0.39
39 Italy 99.0 36 108.9 29 45.0 65 41.3 42 8.6 46 0.37
40 Spain 99.3 35 108.5 34 31.5 91 41.7 39 14.6 18 0.36
41 Chile 99.9 29 110.3 11 39.1 73 41.5 40 6.0 65 0.36
42 United 100.7 17 107.7 46 60.3 38 33.6 69 7.3 57 0.31
Kingdom
43 China 81.2 71 104.4 99 80.7 12 36.7 59 21.0 9 0.28
44 Rwanda 67.5 84 107.1 59 89.1 1 31.3 77 17.1 12 0.27
45 Japan 100.3 22 107.6 49 59.2 40 33.3 72 6.4 62 0.25
46 Israel 97.1 42 104.9 95 50.6 57 47.7 17 9.2 44 0.23
47 Honduras 101.3 9 106.7 67 23.3 103 44.9 27 11.7 30 0.22
48 Mexico 95.6 47 109.7 15 37.3 78 38.8 51 7.3 55 0.20
49 Dominican 104.4 1 106.6 70 17.8 108 43.6 31 10.0 39 0.19
Rep.
50 Costa Rica 99.9 28 106.3 75 28.3 93 39.5 48 12.3 27 0.13
51 Panama 99.7 32 105.6 93 38.7 75 44.5 29 7.5 53 0.13
52 Colombia 101.9 6 108.5 33 28.3 94 39.7 46 4.6 83 0.12
53 Burundi 64.6 86 107.3 56 86.4 4 28.8 81 9.9 41 0.06
54 Zimbabwe 88.4 64 106.2 80 52.3 54 36.1 60 11.6 33 0.04
55 Indonesia 87.4 65 106.0 84 45.1 64 39.3 50 12.2 29 0.02
56 Mauritius 91.8 56 110.6 10 35.4 83 38.5 52 3.0 91 0.02
57 Cyprus 95.6 48 105.9 88 55.4 44 36.0 61 5.4 73 0.01
58 Haiti 89.8 62 106.3 77 69.7 19 37.9 55 3.0 92 0.01
59 Sri Lanka 94.3 52 106.2 79 36.9 79 45.8 24 4.9 78 –0.01
60 Mozambique 43.5 110 107.4 55 88.9 2 16.8 106 15.7 16 –0.04
61 Benin 41.2 111 107.5 52 87.5 3 29.4 80 6.3 64 –0.06
62 Korea, Repu 90.5 61 109.5 16 52.0 55 36.0 63 1.0 104 –0.07
63 Ecuador 97.0 43 106.6 71 24.2 101 42.9 35 5.2 75 –0.08
64 Paraguay 95.0 51 106.6 72 26.1 98 43.2 34 5.6 70 –0.09
65 Greece 92.2 55 107.0 61 35.2 84 39.5 47 5.3 74 –0.11
66 Central Africa 48.4 104 111.4 7 79.8 14 18.0 104 3.9 86 –0.13
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Country REDUC RLEXP REAP SPTAM SPAR SIGE5
67 Guinea-Bissau 35.6 114 107.9 44 65.4 27 25.6 86 12.7 23 –0.14
68 Burkina Faso 44.3 109 107.7 48 84.3 7 25.6 85 5.6 69 –0.15
69 Ghana 53.7 101 106.8 66 64.8 28 33.8 68 7.5 52 –0.18
70 Singapore 87.2 66 107.8 45 49.0 58 31.9 73 3.7 87 –0.19
71 Myanmar 86.9 67 106.2 81 58.9 42 37.8 56 1.8 99 –0.19
72 Bolivia 74.8 78 108.1 39 33.7 87 37.7 57 7.0 58 –0.24
73 Gambia 48.2 106 107.7 47 65.4 26 25.5 87 7.8 49 –0.25
74 Peru 86.0 68 106.5 73 32.3 90 36.9 58 6.4 61 –0.27
75 Malawi 61.2 92 103.4 104 68.0 23 31.6 75 11.6 32 –0.29
76 Iraq 78.0 74 104.7 98 28.5 92 42.6 37 10.8 35 –0.30
77 Fiji 95.6 49 106.1 83 25.5 100 35.5 65 3.9 85 –0.30
78 Malta 99.3 33 106.2 78 27.9 97 35.3 66 1.5 103 –0.30
79 Brazil 96.9 45 108.5 35 37.6 77 13.6 113 5.5 71 –0.31
80 Malaysia 84.2 69 106.0 85 54.8 46 20.5 101 7.6 50 –0.35
81 Cape Verde 78.4 73 103.1 105 36.5 80 46.2 23 7.6 51 –0.35
82 Guatemala 77.6 75 107.9 43 20.0 106 40.9 44 5.2 76 –0.35
83 Cameroon 72.8 80 105.8 90 48.7 60 22.2 96 12.2 28 –0.39
84 Equatorial 64.6 87 107.2 58 64.3 31 25.0 91 3.3 90 –0.41
85 Turkey 75.9 76 108.3 37 53.6 49 23.7 93 1.8 100 –0.46
86 Togo 46.0 107 106.9 65 55.9 43 20.7 100 6.3 63 –0.51
87 Senegal 55.4 100 104.3 100 63.5 32 15.8 109 11.7 31 –0.55
88 Lebanon 79.2 72 106.0 86 36.3 81 31.9 74 2.3 95 –0.57
89 Zambia 75.7 77 103.8 103 40.4 72 29.7 79 6.7 60 –0.59
90 Nigeria 58.6 96 107.0 62 52.3 53 25.4 89 2.1 98 –0.60
91 Zaire 56.2 98 106.9 64 53.7 48 16.1 107 5.4 72 –0.62
92 Cote 57.6 97 106.7 69 53.8 47 14.2 112 4.6 82 –0.69
d’Ivoire
93 Solomon 68.2 82 106.0 87 61.4 37 25.1 90 0.0 110 –0.76
Islands
94 Ethiopia 59.2 95 107.4 54 59.0 41 22.7 94 0.0 111 –0.77
95 Liberia 41.0 112 103.9 102 42.6 69 22.7 95 6.8 59 –0.79
96 Kuwait 90.9 59 105.1 94 23.5 102 34.0 67 0.0 108 –0.79
97 Jordan 89.2 63 105.7 92 12.1 111 30.4 78 0.8 106 –0.80
98 Djibouti 56.1 99 107.0 63 68.6 20 17.4 105 0.0 115 –0.80
99 Sudan 50.5 102 104.9 96 28.2 95 27.3 82 4.6 79 –0.83
336 A. GESKE DIJKSTRA
Appendix Table
Continued
Country REDUC RLEXP REAP SPTAM SPAR SIGE5
100 United Arab 97.7 41 106.3 76 14.0 110 21.4 97 0.0 112 –0.87
Emirates
101 Papua New 67.7 83 102.7 107 68.1 22 25.4 88 0.0 109 –0.91
Guinea
102 Syrian Arab 61.7 91 105.9 89 21.4 105 12.9 114 8.4 47 –0.93
Rep.
103 Algeria 65.6 85 103.1 106 10.6 113 25.7 84 10.0 40 –0.94
104 Mali 48.2 105 107.6 50 18.3 107 19.0 103 2.3 96 –0.98
105 Comoros 74.4 79 101.9 110 66.6 25 20.9 99 0.0 113 –1.01
106 Nepal 35.6 113 97.6 115 53.5 50 36.0 62 2.6 94 –1.03
107 Morocco 49.9 103 105.8 91 26.1 99 24.7 92 0.7 107 –1.04
108 Iran 70.7 81 100.8 111 22.9 104 31.4 76 3.5 89 –1.05
109 Egypt 64.3 88 104.2 101 11.5 112 27.2 83 2.2 97 –1.09
110 Mauritania 59.5 94 107.3 57 27.9 96 19.7 102 0.0 114 –1.10
111 India 63.8 90 100.2 112 36.0 82 15.9 108 7.3 54 –1.13
112 Tunisia 63.9 89 102.4 108 32.7 89 14.3 111 4.3 84 –1.14
113 Bangladesh 60.4 93 98.6 114 8.4 115 21.4 98 10.3 36 –1.34
114 Afghanistan 27.7 115 102.4 109 9.9 114 12.5 115 1.7 101 –1.54
115 Pakistan 45.7 108 100.0 113 15.4 109 15.8 110 1.0 105 –1.63
NOTES
1. Income is “adjusted” to the effect that higher incomes are discounted. The
idea is that the higher the income level, the lower is the contribution of
additional income to well being. See also note 3.
2. HDI includes tertiary education in this enrolment figure.
3. The calculation of the income component of the GDI and the HDI has also
undergone another change between 1998 and 1999: UNDP no longer uses
the Atkinson method to adjust per capita incomes, but instead natural loga-
rithms of per capita incomes which are then indexed. Following the Atkinson
method, indexing for the GDI was done as a final step, after multiplying
adjusted incomes with the population-weighted harmonic mean of the propor-
tional income shares. In order to be able to analyze the effect of the Bardhan
and Klasen change only, I use logarithms for both cases.
4. They propose two further alternatives; one solves the problem of the unequal
punishing of inequality at different GDP per capita, and the other excludes
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the problematic income component alltogether. However, the alternatives are
still no measure of gender inequality as such.
5. See, Wieringa (1997a). The Workshop was held at the Institute of Social
Studies and was financed by the Directorate General for International Cooper-
ation (DGIS) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The countries of origin
of the participants included Bhutan, Benin, Costa Rica, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom and Viet Nam. The country choice is partly related to
the Agreements on Sustainable Development that the Dutch government has
concluded with Benin, Bhutan and Costa Rica.
6. For education, the power was 5 and for share in parliament, the power was
0.5.
7. Reverse order is needed because the number of countries listed is not the same
for SIGE, GDI and GEM.
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